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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THELMA EDLUND,
Plaintiff,

-vs.COM~IISSION
OFTHESTATEOFUTA~THE

THE INDrSTRIAL

Case No. 7709

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
AND RAWLINGS, 'VALLACE,
BLACK & ROBERTS,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIF·F

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff herein will be referred to as plaintiff, The
Industrial Commission will be referred to as the commission and the other defendants as defendants.
All italics are ours.
This matter comes before the Court on Petition for
Writ of Certiorari filed by plaintiff on June 7, 1951, on
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which there was a return by the commission on June 29,
1951. It arises out of plaintiff's application for workmen's compensation, which application was numbered
0. D. 90 by the commission and which was filed on the
30th of August, 1950. The Industrial Commission hearing
was held on February 7, 1951, and its decision was dated
March 26, 1951, application for rehearing was denied
May 16, 1951.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff for over seventeen years preceding October
15, 1950, was a legal typist and stenographer. She had
worked for a number of law firms and since 1944 had
been employed by the law firm of Rawlings, Wallace,
Black & Roberts (R. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14).
In 1947 plaintiff noticed some pain in the end joints
of her fingers as she typed. The pain was not so severe
as to be disabling, but all of the fingers with the exception of the thumb on the left hand became swollen (R.14).
Plaintiff was working a five and a half day week
and during four hours of each day she was typing constantly (R. 13). The thumb of the left hand was not in
any way used by plaintiff in her typing work, and it was
the only digit in which there was no swelling and no
soreness. In each of the other eight fingers and thumb
there was a swelling, soreness and a bony nodular growth,
which increased in size from 1948 on (R. 15, 16).
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The legal work 'vhich plaintiff perfonned over the
seyenteen years required the typing of large numbers
of carbon copies and as a consequence the force with
which plaintiff necessarily struck the keys of the typewriter was greater than would normally be the case in
an ordinary typing operation (R. 13, 14). The only place
where there was any soreness, swelling or nodular growth
on plaintiff's hands or other joints of her body was at
the end joint of the nine fingers of her hands. No other
joint of plaintiff's hand was in any way sore or involved
in nodular growth. The shock caused to the hands by
typing operations travels through the end of the fingers
and into the first joint of each finger. The place where
the nodules on the right thumb appeared was at the point
where plaintiff's right thumb struck the space bar as
she used it in typing (R. 15 and 24). Plaintiff had never
had any rheumatism, stiffness of the joints or other
similar pains or ailments during the seventeen years she
worked as a legal stenographer. The nodules or bony
growths on the end joints of plaintiff's nine fingers first
appeared in 1948 (R. 16). In 1949 plaintiff consulted a
physician concerning her hands. Pain in the fingers continued to increase in intensity and seemed to be more
severe at the end of a lot of typing. The only times that
plaintiff was relieved from pain in her fingers was during her vacation when she was not working (R. 17). The
aggravation and increase in the intensity of the pain
continued until plaintiff was forced to quit her work on
October 15, 1950 (R. 17, 18). Since plaintiff ceased her
employment she has noticed that her fingers are not
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nearly as painful as they were and that the nodulations
have not increased in size. The soreness and tenderness
on pressure on the end joints of plaintiff's fingers has
also decreased in its intensity (R.12 and 23).
Three doctors appeared as witnesses, two for plaintiff and one for defendants. There is no real conflict in
their testimony. Dr. Beech testified that he found no
abnormal conditions in plaintiff except the end joints
of her fingers, which showed on x-ray the bony growths
and narrowing of the joint space at the distal joint on
nine of plaintiff's ten fingers. He diagnosed the condition as osteoarthritis, a disease involving the cartilage
on the joint on the ends of plaintiff's fingers (R. 31). Dr.
Beech stated that the causes of the disease are not known,
but two causes are rather well accepted. They are age
and injury (R. 31). Plaintiff was the first patient Dr.
Beech had ever seen whose complaint was primarily
osteoarthritis, although he had observed the condition in
a number of other persons. He stated frankly that there
was no authority who claims to know the cause of plaintiff's arthritic condition. However, it is well accepted
that injury may cause a deformity of the fingers similar
in appearance to the deformity of plaintiff's fingers. He
was definite that trauma is considered one of the primary
causes of the disease (R. 33). For example, the growth
which results from the fingers being struck by a baseball (R. 36). He also testified that typing can be considered a form of trauma. He was somewhat surprised
that the type of disease found in plaintiff's fingers was
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not seen more often in typists. There was no doubt that
the nodulation or arthritis in plaintiff's fingers could be
caused by the direct trauma resulting from the striking
of the typewriter keys (R. 37).
Dr. L. Gurr :J[cQuarrie, plaintiff's general physician
and surgeon, who treated the condition of plaintiff's
hands for approximately two years, stated his opinion
concerning the condition of plaintiff's hands. He said
(R. -!2) :

1!1·

"A. Yes, my opinion is that the type of work
she does and the stress and strain would definitely
be a causative factor in the development of the
osteoarthritis; not the total cause but the contributing cause of it."
Dr. Norman R. Beck, a specialist in orthopedic
surgery, testifying on behalf of plaintiff stated that
osteoarthritis is considered to be a degenerative disease,
the etiology is not definitely known. It causes a degeneration of the cartilage in the joint and overgrowth of the
bone adjacent to it (R. 46). Several factors contribute
to development of osteoarthritis, one being heredity.
_.,.

Trauma is another causative factor which may cause
arthritis to develop in an .individual. at a younger age
than would otherwise be the fact (R. 46).
In regard to the heredity of plaintiff, she testified
that many of her relatives have lived their full three
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score and ten years and no one in her family that she
knew of had ever been afflicted with arthritis, rheumatism or arthritic conditions of their joints (R. 48, 49).
Concerning the types of trauma which could be a
cause of arthritis, Dr. Beck stated as follows (R. 49, 50):
"A. Well, nobody knows definitely what
causes arthritis. Trauma sometimes is a cause,
severe trauma is mentioned as a possibility; repeated minor insults to a joint; normal use, and
wear and tear. My personal feelings, as I mentioned before, if they had a predisposition. If it
is not in a person's heredity then you definitely
rule out that fact. Repeated trauma, minor traumas and insults conceivably could result in arthritis at an earlier age."
The x-rays of plaintiff's hands showed a definite
nodular growth on all of her fingers and on her right
thumb, but there was no nodular growth shown on the
left thumb.
Plaintiff's claim is presented under Sec. 42-1a-28,
Utah Code .Annotated, 1943, as amended by Laws of
1949, Senate Bill 288, which was approved and in effect
March 5, 1949. Subsection (28) of Section 28 was added
by the amendment of 1949. It reads as follows:
"(28)

Such other diseases or injuries to health
which directly arise as a natural incident of
the exposure occasioned by the employment,
provided, however, that such a disease or
injury to health shall be compensable only
in those instances where it is shown by
the employee or his dependents that all of
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the following nmned circun1stances were
present: ( 1) a dirert causal connection
between the conditions under which the
work is performed and the disease or injury
to health; (2) the disease or injury to
health can be seen to have followed as a
natural incident of the work as a result of
the exposure occasioned by the employment; (3) the disease or injury to health
can be fairly traced to the employment as
to the proximate cause; (4) the disease or
injury to health is not of a character to
which the employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the employment ;
( 5) the disease or injury to health is incidental to the character of the business and
not independent of the relation of the employer and employee ; and ( 6) the disease
or injury to health must appear to have
had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment and to have flowed from that
source as a natural consequence, though it
need not have been foreseen or expected
before discovery. No disease or injury to
health shall be found compensable where it
is of a character to which the general public
is commonly exposed."
The commission in its Findings of F·act and Conclusions of Law, while not finding that there was a direct
causal connection between the conditions under which
plaintiff worked and her physical condition, assumed
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such causal relationship (R. 56). The commission then
stated that it was the applicant's burden to establish (R.
56):

"* * * (1) that the disease or injury to health
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned
by the employment, (2) the disease or injury to
health is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee, ( 3) the disease or injury to
health must appear to have had its origin in a
work connected with the employment and to have
flowed from that source as a natural consequence
although it need not have been foreseen before discovery and (4) that the disease or injury to health
for which she seeks compensation is not of a
character to which the general public is commonly
exposed."
It then states, apparently as a conclusion of law, that
the legislature only intended to make compensable those
diseases which could be recognized as commonly associated with a particular employment, citing as an example silicosis (R. 56).
As final grounds for denying plaintiff the benefit
of the occupational disease act, the referee states as
follows (R. 57):
"It is the referee's opinion, and he so finds,
that the disease for which compensation is claimed
is not an occupational disease. It is not the customary and usual result in the typing occupation."
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SU:M~IARY

OF ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY MISCONSTRUED
THE l\IEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 42-la-28 (28)
AND UNLAWFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF HER DISABILITY COMPENSATION.
(1)

WAS

THERE A DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION

BETWEEN

THE CONDITION UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S WORK WAS PERFORMED
AND THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HER HEALTH?

(2)

THE DISEASE AND INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE SEEN TO

HAVE FOLLOWED AS A NATURAL INCIDENT OF THE WORK AS A RESULT
OF EXPOSURE OCCASIONED BY THE EMPLOYMENT.

(3)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE FAIRLY

TRACED TO THE EMPLOYMENT AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

(4)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS NOT OF A CHAR-

ACTER TO WHICH THE EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL EXPOSURE OUTSIDE OF THE EMPLOYMENT.

(5)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS INCIDENTAL TO

THE CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AND NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE
RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.

(6)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH MUST APPEAR TO

HAVE HAD ITS ORIGIN IN A RISK CONNECTED WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AND TO HAVE FLOWED FROM THAT SOURCE AS A NATURAL
CONSEQUENCE, THOUGH IT NEED NOT HAVE BEEN FORESEEN OR
EXPECTED BEFORE DISCOVERY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY MISCONSTRUED
THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 42-la-28 (28)
AND UNLAWFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF HER DISABILITY COMPENSATION.
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Plaintiff's appeal is a case of first impression under
Subsection (28) of Sec. 42-la-28. Plaintiff's research has
failed to reveal any similar section which has been interpreted in any neighboring jurisdictions. Such help as
can be found must be supplied strictly by analogy.
By taking each of the numbered requirements in
subsection (28) and applying the requirement to the
evidence in plaintiff's action, plaintiff will attempt to
demonstrate that she qualifies under each and every
provision.
( 1)

WAS THERE A DIRECT CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN

THE CONDITION UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S WORK WAS PERFORMED
AND THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HER HEALTH?

The question above must be answered in the affirmative. The commission while not finding that there was a
direct causal connection, assumed that such direct causal
connection existed. Under the evidence a finding was
mandatory that there was such a direct causal connection.
Any other finding would be contrary to all of the evidence
which was presented. Dr. Beech, who was produced by
the defendant, Insurance Fund, and for whose testimony
that organization vouches, stated 'that in his opinion
such a causal connection would exist. A finding that
no causal connection existed in the face of the evidence
that the only joints in plaintiff's whole body which were
affected by the arthritis were the eight end joints of
plaintiff's fingers and the thumb of her right hand, would
be arbitrary and capricious. The joints affected were the
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only joints subjected to the repeated traumatic injury
caused by the striking of the fingers and thumb against
the keys of the typewriter. If the arthritic condition
steins from some other cause, why is it that no other
joint in plaintiff's hands was affected 1 There are two
other joints in the same fingers in which the single joint
is affected.
(2)

THE DISEASE AND INJURY TO H.EM-TH CAN BE SEEN TO

HAVE FOLLOWED AS A NATURAL INCIDENT OF THE WORK AS RESULT
OF EXPOSURE OCCASIONED BY THE EMPLOYMENT.

-·

Under the present facts it is difficult to see exactly
how the second requirement differs materially from the
first requirement. Of course, having a causal connection
and being the kind of ailment which is a result of the
shock and traumatic injury to plaintiff's fingers, acting
through the state of her health and the tissues, bones,
tendons and muscles of her fingers, the disease with
which she is afflicted could only be a natural incident of
the work to which she was exposed by her employment.
The word "natural" has no different legal meaning than
its use in the vernacular. Black's Law Dictionary, Third
Edition, p. 1222.

/

(3)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH CAN BE FAIRLY

TRACED TO THE EMPLOYMENT AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

It will be recalled that the only times when plaintiff did not have aggravation of the condition of her
fingers and the only times when she did not have pain
in her fingers were when she was not engaged in the
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usual work of her employment, namely, typing. As far as
proximate cause is concerned, there was no intervening
agency of any kind which occurred between the incident
or injury, namely, the traumatic impact of plaintiff's
fingers against the typewriter keys, and the disease from
which she suffered. The force applied to the hands of
her fingers traveled only to the first joint of her fingers
and there caused the abnormal and diseased condition
of the tissues and joints. A more direct close proximate
causation situation could hardly be imagined. When the
words proximate cause are used, it is assumed that the
legislature intended those words to mean the same as
they normally mean in our legal vocabulary. We have
long accepted proximate cause as meaning that cause,
which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
Black's ·Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 1457. We
recognize proximate cause as the efficient cause,
the producing cause, the one that necessarily sets the
other causes in operation.
(4)·

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS NOT OF A CHAR-

ACTER TO WHICH THE EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL EXPOSURE OUTSIDE OF THE EMPLOYMENT.

Considerable testimony was elicited, both by plaintiff and defendants, concerning plaintiff's activities and
the possibility that ringing out washcloths or dish towels
might in some way contribute to or affect the condition
of plaintiff's hands. All attempts to show that outside

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
factors enter in any way into the picture of causation
failed. The nature of plaintiff's injuries and the places
on her fingers which are affected, for all practical purposes, eliminates any kind of normal activity as a causative factor. There is no household work which results
in force being applied to the ends of a person's fingers;
there is no outside engagement of any kind in which
plaintiff was involved which could possibly affect only
the end joints of plaintiff's fingers. Activities such as
using a broom or dusting or washing dishes, require the
use of all of the joints in the fingers and hands.
(5)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH IS INCIDENTAL TO

THE CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AND NOT INDEPENDENT OF THE
RELATION OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.

:o-

Plaintiff's employment as a legal stenographer required the devotion of at least four hours per day to continuous typing. This activity was on manual operating
typewriters and in the work a great many extra carbon
copies were necessary. All of these facts are very material. They explain, perhaps, why arthritis developed in
plaintiff's hands, while many other typists do not become
afflicted with the disease. In the typing of carbons, it
is necessary that an extra amount of force be used in
striking the keys. This force, which the medical profession recognizes as trauma and which Dr. Beech described
as repeated insults to the end joints of plaintiff's fingers,
all were incidental to the character of the business and
were dependent on the relation of employer and employee. No other place, except in her employment as a
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typist, was plaintiff exposed to this type of injury. This
is not the situation which this court discussed in Tavey
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 106 Utah 489, 150 P.
2d 379, where the employee's dizziness had no connection
and was entirely independent of the relation of employer
and employee. Here all of the detrimental injurious effects flow from the basic cause of plaintiff's condition,
namely, the typing activity in which she engaged while
on the job.
(6)

THE DISEASE OR INJURY TO HEALTH MUST APPEAR TO

HAVE HAD ITS ORIGIN IN A RISK CONNECTED WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AND TO HAVE FLOWED FROM THAT SOURCE AS A NATURAL
CONSEQUENCE, THOUGH IT NEED NOT HAVE BEEN FORESEEN OR
EXPECTED BEFORE DISCOVERY.

The origin of plaintiff's disease was, of course, a risk
connected with her employment. There was always the
risk that some person employed in typing by defendants,
because of the repeated traumatic injury caused by striking the typewriter keys, might incur the disease of
arthritis. It is not necessary that this particular disease
or condition have been foreseen, and perhaps if plaintiff's case were the first time that arthritis of the fingers
was caused by typing, such a result could not have been
foreseen, but as requirement No. 2 states, foreseeability
is not necessary. The risk being present, regardless of
whether it was known or unknown, if the disease flowed
from the risk as a natural consequence, then it is compensable.
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Subsection ~8 states that no disease or injury to
health shall be found cmnpensable where it is of a character to which the general public is commonly exposed.
Regarding this particular requirement, it is, of course,
only a sn1all group of the public who would in any way
be exposed to the kind of disease from which plaintiff
suffers, and an even smaller percentage of the typists
who were exposed would incur the disease which afflicted
plaintiff. The general public is not commonly typing
four hours a day in an employment which requires the
making of large number of carbon copies.
It is difficult to conceive of a diseased condition
which more fully conforms to the requirements of Subsection (28) than does plaintiff's condition. The Industrial Commission, however, thought that an additional
requirement was tacked on to the language of Subsection
(28). It concluded that before plaintiff could recover, the
disease must also be a recognized occupational disease,
such as silicosis. This conclusion, plaintiff submits, is
obviously erroneous. Section 42-la-28 lists a number of
occupational diseases. Perhaps the list is not exhaustive,
but if it is not, it was intended to be as exhaustive as
was possible at the time the law was drawn. Subsection
(28) is the catchall section. It, plaintiff submits, was
: ·~·.

intended to provide compensation for diseases and injuries to health which were not recognized as occupational diseases, but which nevertheless grew out of the
occupation in which the injured employee was working.
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Subsection (28) does not say "such other occupational diseases or injuries to health which directly arise,"
etc. It says "such other diseases or injuries to health
which directly arise," etc. If the legislature intended to
still limit compensation to known recognized occupational
diseases, the logical, common sense way to accomplish
that end would be to add to the list of diseases contained
in Section 28.
When the legislature left out the modifying word
"occupational" in Subsection (28), it, plaintiff submits,
opened the benefits for all diseases or injuries to health
that could meet the qualifications set down and numbered
( 1) to ( 6) in the subsection.
As a conclusion of law the commissiOn states as
follows what it considers to be the legislature's intention:
"The legislature clearly intended to make
compensable only those diseases which can be
recognized as commonly associated with a particular employment, as silicosis is associated with
metal mining."
If such were the intention of the legislature, subsection (28) is a most clumsy way of accomplishing that
end. The diseases which can be recognized as· commonly
associated with a particular employment are listed in
the other subsections of Section 28. By subsection (28)
the legislature, plaintiff submits, intended to broaden
and expand the types of diseases and injuries to health
for which compensation should be paid. The conclusion
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of law quoted would defeat any such intention. It would
place upon a claimant the great and probably insurmountable burden of proving that the disease from which
she suffered was one which was commonly associated
with her employ1nent. How great an incident of the disease would be necessary before it became commonly
associated with an employment? Where would the claimant find statistics to show the frequency with which
arthritis occurred among typists employed four hours a
day in constant typing where large numbers of carbon
copies were required 1 Certainly the right to compensation which was granted in subsection (28) would mean
very little to any employee if such is the requirement.
The right, plaintiff submits, would be a myth and an
illusion. The burden of showing common association or
that the disease was a customary or usual result of the
employment would be insurmountable and unbearable.
The State of Washington has a unique provision, but
somewhat analogous to subsection (28). Their statute
provides for occupational disease benefits for all diseases or infections which arise naturally and proximately
out of the extra-hazardous employment in which the
employee was engaged. No specific occupational diseases
are listed.
TheWashington Supreme Court in Simpson Logging
Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 32 Wash. 2d
472, 202 P. 2d 448, interpreted the meaning of the act.
The employee had incurred the disease of asthma from
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breathing dust, smoke and fumes which accumulated at
the place where he tended a certain paper machine in the
plant of his employer. The Washington Department of
Labor and Industry awarded plaintiff compensation.
The employer appealed on two grounds: (a) That the
claimant was not suffering from asthma; and (b) that
asthma was not a compensable occupational disease under
the Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington. The
Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was sufficient
as to the nature of his ailment and then discussed the
question of whether or not asthma could be considered
as the type of injury for which the occupational disease
benefits were intended. In the discussion of the law the
following principles were set forth at page 452:
"The intent of the legislature must be drawn
from the language used in the present statute. Decisions interpreting dissimilar statutes or the common law can be of little assistance to us. There
is nothing in the language of the present statute,
defining occupational disease as, 'occupational
disease' means such disease or infection as arises
naturally and proximately out of extra-hazardous
employment," that would warrant reading into it
the tests of the Seattle Can Co. case. The legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the
meaning of "proximate cause" as used by the
courts, and that being so, when they are defined as
an occupational disease those diseases or infections as arise naturally and proximately out of
extra-hazardous employment, it would follow that
they meant that the condition of the extrahazardous employment must be the proximate
cause of the disease for which claim for compensa-
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tion is made, and that the cause 1nust be proximate
in the sense that there existed no intervening independent and sufficient cause for the disease,
so that the disease would not have been contracted
but for the condition existing in the extra-hazardous employment. Under the present act no disease can be held not to be an occupational disease
as a matter of law where it has been proved that
the conditions of the extra-hazardous employment
in which the claimant was employed naturally and
proximately produced the disease and that but for
the exposure to such conditions the disease would
not have been contracted."
The Industrial Commission in its conclusion in the
present case is attempting to say that unless the injury
to health or disease from which an employee suffers is
a recognized occupational disease or is one which is
commonly and usually found in the occupation in which
plaintiff was working, no compensation can be awarded.
Why such an interpretation is made, it is impossible
to understand. No part of the language of Subsection
(28) will stand such an interpretation. In line with the
liberal hwnane purposes of occupational disease acts
and worlanen's compensation generally, the exact opposite interpretation of subsection (28) should be required.
The language of the section shows an intent on the part
of the legislature to provide compensation for the numerous diseases and afflictions which were neither known
or commonly recognized occupational diseases. The only
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thing they thought should be the requirement is that the
disease or injury to health flowed directly, naturally and
proximately from the employment in which the employee
was engaged.
What could be more just and equitable than to require the industry which was the cause of the disease to
bear the burden and loss caused by the disease.
We have long ago recognized that justice requires
the spreading of the cost of injury incurred in an industry. Only the industry can pass the loss on and distribute it among large numbers of people. Should it
make any difference whether the particular injury is a
recognized occupational disease or only one which arises
so infrequently as not to be commonly recognized as
occupational1 Plaintiff submits that the legislature intended to cover all diseases and injuries to health that
arise naturally and proximately out of the injured employee's work, and this court should promote and not
defeat this humane equitable purpose.
Plaintiff submits that the result reached by the
Washington Court in the Simpson Logging Co. case is the
liberal humane interpretation that this court should
adopt. It should announce that under our act "no disease can be held not to be an occupational disease as a
matter of law where it has been proved that the conditions of the * * * employment' in which the claimant was
employed naturally and proximately produced the disease."
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this court should
determine that the decision of The Industrial Commission is in excess of its powers and that plaintiff is entitled to an award of full con1pensation for the disability
which she has suffered as a result of the arthritic condition of the fingers of her hands.
Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING,
Attorney for Plaintiff,

530 Judge Buildin~
Salt Lake City, Utah
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